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Judicial De Novo Review of Administrative
Quasi-Judicial Fact Determinations
By MoRRIs D. FoRKoscH*

HEN and under what circumstances must Article III courts constitutionally exercise an independent power to go fully and substantively, on the merits, into an agency's findings of fact when reviewing
quasi-judicial determinations? That is, when must there be de novo
review of such an administrative determination? This question is not
W

new, has seemingly been fully explored, and apparently has been laid

to rest, yet a different view and a new approach may yield fresh insights, perhaps even result in a changed judicial understanding and
application. Consequently, it is worth the effort to re-examine this
problem.
Ordinarily, the judicial inspection is a procedurally limited one,
e.g., the substantial evidence rule on the whole record applies, with

agency findings of fact in a quasi-judicial proceeding being final if so
supported.1 The reviewing court delves into the findings and the facts
* J.S.D., 1948, New York University; Ph.D., 1952, New School. Visiting Professor, Gonzaga University School of Law.
1. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951); see M. FoRKosCH,
ADMINmTRArvE LAw §§ 246-246g (1956) [hereinafter cited as ADMInSmTVE LAW];
Forkosch, Has the "Whole Record" Formula Superseded the "Substantial Evidence"
Rule?, 3 LAB. L.J. 455, 519 (1952).
The whole record rule is still the substantial evidence rule, plus the added fact
which appears for the first time in or after the agency's final determination, namely,
the disagreement, if any, between agency and hearing examiner (today the administrative trial judge) concerning any finding of fact recommended by the latter and that
adopted or found by the former. Thus all three participants, namely, the administrative trial judge, the agency, and the reviewing court use the substantial evidence rule
in their deliberations, with the last also getting the added possible fact of disagreement.
The "proof' that the substantial evidence rule is used throughout is simple. The
agency has, of course, power, unless limited by its basic statute, to take over the trial
role at any time it desires, either at the outset, or during the hearing conducted by
an administrative trial judge, or at the conclusion of the hearing. See, e.g., ADIMINSTRATNv LAw, supra, at § 214. However, a statute may restrict this power, NLRB v.
Stocker Mfg. Co., 185 F.2d 451, 454 (3d Cir. 1950) (Administrative Procedure Act
[963]
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only in a limited fashion, i.e., just enough to ascertain if there is a
sufficient factual basis in the record to say that the findings are substantially supported.2 In other words, the court does not look into
the record's evidentiary facts to determine for itself whether on the
merits it feels that it would make the same finding or, if not, then
to remand; its own views on the merits are not competent; its only
task is to ascertain the substantiality of the agency's findings as disclosed by the record. However, even though the substantial evidence
rule is the rule ordinarily followed, there do exist areas where broader,
and even narrower, reviews are permissibly found.'
These areas of review may stem from a constitutional right or
a statutorily created right or grant. The question initially propounded
involves the former; albeit, the latter is also present. Even in a constitutionally grounded review there may be variations and differences,
both as to procedure and scope. Some of these will be explored
briefly so as to delimit the opening question and to remove ambiguities.

I
There is, first, the general field which must be considered.

This

ordinarily involves whether a person has a constitutional right which
is being invaded or of which he is being deprived. For example, Justice Brandeis once wrote:
Pensions, compensation allowances and privileges are gratuities.
§ 5(c), 5 U.S.C. § 5(c) (1970)), or a departmental rule may intervene, United States
ex rel. Ohm v. Perkins, 79 F.2d 533 (2d Cir. 1935). If the agency does try the matter
or determine it on the trial record, then obviously no "disagreement" on any finding
of fact can occur. In this situation the court's review cannot include what is not present, albeit all participants in the review may mouth the whole record rule qua language.
2. In effect this permits the reviewing court to utilize a rule of law, as the substantial evidence rule is, to peek into the facts and practically evaluate them so as to
ascertain if there is a sufficient factual basis to support the finding(s). There is nothing remarkable in this. In suits under the full faith and credit clause, U.S. CONST.
art. 4, § 1, the forum state into which a judgment of a rendering state is brought for
enforcement may do just this-go behind the judgment to ascertain whether or not enforcement should thus be permitted. Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co., 296 U.S.
268 (1935) (revenue laws as basis for judgment); Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657
(1892) (permitting a look-see to determine if the judgment stemmed from an original
cause of action which was penal); Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265 (1888)
(penalty for failure to file an annual report as basis for judgment).
3. This assumes throughout that no "roadblocks" prevent such judicial reviewthat no requirement has first to be met such as exhausting internal agency procedures
(ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 1, at §§ 296-98), final order (Id. § 299), primary
jurisdiction (Id. at § 302), standing (Id. at § 303), ripeness (Id. at § 305), and others.
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They involve no agreement of parties; and the grant of them cre-

ates no vested right.

The benefits conferred by gratuities may

be redistributed
or withdrawn at any time in the discretion of Con4
gress.

These are, therefore, nonconstitutional fields, so that until a statutorily
authorized grant is made of, for example, benefits under the Aid to

Families with Dependent Children program, no constitutional right to
any hearing, either by an agency or a court may ordinarily attach;
thereafter, of course, any agency effort to withdraw such granted benefits without notice deprives the recipient of a constitutional right which
necessitates a prior due process hearing.'
The point is that without the applicability to an agency of certain
substantive constitutional rights, the grantor-delegator is ordinarily unhindered within this administrative area, and so judicial review may
even be precluded. For example, this situation arises in decisions involving veterans' benefits, 6 immigration questions, 7 and extensions of
4. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 577 (1934). Nevertheless, Lynch held
that insurance, or war risk, policies were contracts, and therefore property, and so created vested rights. Of course, constitutional rights such as First Amendment, equal
protection of the laws, and due process of law, must be observed if applicable. E.g.,
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
5. In Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), aid to appellant AFDC recipients
was terminated without prior notice. Although agency regulations permitted post-termination hearings, appellants contended they were entitled to a pre-termination hearing
as a matter of due process. The Supreme Court agreed. See note 21 infra for cases
allowing post-termination hearing due to emergency situations.
6. In this area Congress may constitutionally enact a law that "the decisions of
the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs on any question of law or fact concerning a
claim for benefits or payments.., shall be final and conclusive and no other official
or any court of the United States shall have power or jurisdiction to review any such
decision." Act of October 17, 1940, 54 Stat. 1197; accord, Di Silvestro v. United
States Veterans Administration, 132 F. Supp. 692 (E.D.N.Y. 1955). Insurance cases
are treated differently, for obvious reasons, both statutorily and decisionally. See
Lynch v. United States, 296 U.S. 571, 587 (1934); United States v. Williams, 278 U.S.
255, 257-58 (1929).
7. The early case of Fok Yung Yo v. United States, 185 U.S. 296, 305 (1902)
stated that the executive had been delegated the power by Congress to make final determinations on admissibility, and therefore judicial review or intervention was precluded. Thus in immigration, not deportation, cases "we are dealing. . . with a matter
of privilege. Petitioner had no vested right of entry . . . ." United States ex rel.
Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) (emphasis in original). "Whatever
the procedure authorized by Congress, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry
is concerned." Id.; accord, Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206
(1953); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952). Of course, Congress may
authorize procedures which will be conclusively presumed to provide due process.
United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 263 (1905). In all these laws judicial construction and interpretation ordinarily govern. Furthermore, there is no Eighth
Amendment claim of cruel and unusual punishment available to an alien not physically
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time of voluntary departure after a final deportation order.' Similarly,
the review may be narrowed almost to the point of insignificance, in
applications for a suspension of deportation.9 Of course the powers
of agencies to act thus is subject to interpretation.1" In other words,
"the right of appeal on other than constitutional grounds may [ordinarily] be conferred or withheld, at the discretion of the Legislature.""
A subsidiary question may still arise, even within this nonconstitutional or highly restricted field, namely, has the delegatee complied
with all statutorily imposed requirements and limitations so that judicial
review, limited solely to these ultra vires aspects, may nevertheless
be had. For the rule of law and not of men requires some review
1
to prevent what Justice Cardozo termed "unconfined and vagrant'
"delegation running riot."'1 3 There is one observation to be added to
in the country. See United States ex rel. Ulrich v. Kellogg, 30 F.2d 985, 986 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 868 (1929).
8. Randazzo v. Esperdy, 334 F. Supp. 1083, 1085 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), citing 8
C.F.R. § 244.2 (1970); United States ex rel. Bartsch v. Watkins, 175 F.2d 245 (2d
Cir. 1949). Even if reviewable, the Randazzo court stated that "the scope of review
is quite narrow [a clear abuse of discretion]." 334 F. Supp. at 1086. See also Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c) (1970).
9. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1970). For application of this statute see Foti v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 308 F.2d 779 (2d
Cir. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 375 U.S. 217 (1963); Barreiro v. Brownell, 215
F.2d 585, 587 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 887 (1954); Leontis v. Esperdy,
175 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), aff'd, 283 F.2d 514 (2d Cir. 1960).
However, even in suspension cases the Attorney General may not add to the statutory requirements. E.g., Asimakopoulos v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 445
F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1971). It would be an abuse of discretion if a denial were made
without a rational explanation, or he inexplicably departed from established policies,
or it rested on an impermissible basis. See, e.g., Wong Wing Hang v. Immigration
and Naturalization Serv., 360 F.2d 715, 719 (2d Cir. 1966).
10. In a selective service case, Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 120, 122
(1946), Justice Douglas interpreted "final" as limited to agency finality of orders and
not to a limitation on court review. In Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 51
(1955), the Court interpreted "final" in the immigration statute in the same way as
Estep. See also Administrative Procedure Act § 10(a), 5 U.S.C. § 702(a) (1970). See
note 7 supra.
11. Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531, 547 (1914). Or, phrased
differently, "[aill constitutional questions aside, it is for Congress to determine how
the rights which it creates shall be enforced." Switchman's Union of North America
v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297, 301 (1943) (but not necessarily applicable
to review). "It is hardly lack of due process for the Government to regulate that
which it subsidizes." Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 131 (1942).
12. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935) (Cardozo, J., concurring).
13. Id. at 553. Justice Cardozo was referring to a delegation, sans any reasonable standards which would delimit the activities of the agency, whereas here we are
concerned with a proper delegation but activities going beyond the area so delegated.
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the preceding, namely, that regardless of whether or not a constitutional or nonconstitutional field is involved and whether or not the
power being exercised is judicial or nonjudicial, the delegator by statutory authority may mandate a judicial-type or adjudicatory hearing in
the agency before it makes its final determination. 14 In any event,
See also Kwock Ian Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454, 457-58 (1920). This concept has
gone to the point of ignoring the exhaustion doctrine where the agency is violating
a specific prohibition upon the exercise of its jurisdiction. See Leedom v. Kyne, 358
U.S. 184 (1958). See note 6 supra.
The cases cited in note 7 supra establish the nonreviewability of agency determinations in the immigration area. Some commentators feel that the Supreme Court has
shied away from this approach. E.g., L. JAFFE, JUIcIAL CONTROL OF ADMInSTRATivE
ACTION 340 (1965) [hereinafter cited as JAFFE], citing Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U.S. 3,
9 (1903). Such a conclusion does not necessarily follow from that case. In Gegiow
v. Uhl a statute mandated exclusion when the immigrant was "likely to become a public
charge." 239 U.S. at 9. The agency, then Secretary of Labor, interpreted the language
one way; this was rejected by Justice Holmes, so that on the Court's view admission
should not have been denied on this account. '"The statute by enumerating the conditions upon which the allowance to land may be denied, prohibits the denial in other
cases. And when the record shows that a commissioner of immigration is exceeding
his power, the alien may demand his release upon habeas corpus." Id. In other words,
upon the Court's independent interpretation of the law, the agency acted ultra vires,
which would mean the rule of man above law unless stopped. See notes 6, 7 & 9
supra, and note 14 infra. See also Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958) (statutory
prohibition).
What is really involved in all this is the distinction between a constitutional right
and a statutory privilege. In the latter, Congress may give or deny, whereas in the
former it must conform or may, perhaps, exceed (if otherwise constitutional). Where
a statute is involved then the meaning of Congress is involved, and unless this meaning
is crystal-clear the courts may interpret (and Congress may thereafter reverse, assuming
otherwise acting constitutionally). In other words the power of Congress is not in
issue, but only the meaning of Congress, and in this the High Court exercises final
say (subject as per the preceding). Which, pari passu, also means that the Court may
change its interpretation, its mind, its view, and its holdings. That is all that is involved here. We are therefore still left with the questions whether, in a constitutional
field where such rights are involved: (a) may Congress preclude judicial review; (b)
must the Supreme Court grant a de novo review?
14. It may also be observed that even where constitutionally mandated, if the
agency has not been authorized (delegated) power to hold any kind of hearing, it will
be acting ultra vires if it does so. Thus, in some instances courts will interpret the
basic statute as granting the implied right and power to do so. See, e.g., Hecht v.
Monaghan, 307 N.Y. 461, 121 N.E.2d 421 (1954). Where the statute is ambiguous,
i.e., the agency is not statutorily mandated to use the adjudicative procedure but does so,
still, where "the difficulties experienced by the Commission in seeking to regulate"
have resulted in Supreme Court "encouragement .. .to innovate," a change in the
procedure for agency rate making from a company-by-company adjudicative one, to an
area basis legislative one, and, finally, to the present nationwide rulemaking one does
not result in a deprivation of procedural due process. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. FPC,
475 F.2d 842, 850 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. den. - U.S. -, 94 S. Ct. 901 (1974)
(Douglas, J.voting to grant cert. and Powell, J., not participating), relying on In re
Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968).
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whether constitutionally or statutorily mandated, it is that type of full
hearing from which the judicial review is later sought.
Another area which may be considered illustrates a different aspect of a court's reviewing powers and function. In effect, this is
really not a "review," as here discussed; rather, it is to be likened
to an internal agency appeal so that the court turns into a superagency.
For example, Congress has plenary power over the District of Columbia akin to that of a state, so that the national legislature, if it so desires, may require the local courts to assume legislative powers. In
other words, an appeal to the local court from an agency's rate-making
proceeding and determination may turn the court, by virtue of the statutory language, into another agency, so that now the court may make
and substitute its own findings of fact.1" If Congress attempted to
do this to an Article III court the statute would be unconstitutional, 6
i.e., overmuch of a statutorily granted reviewing power may be bad
where the agency discretion in determining findings of fact, even
Where the agency, without authorization voluntarily indulges in such a quasijudicial proceeding, a subsequent court's full hearing is not a de novo one. To
illustrate this last comment reference is made to Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R.R.,
236 U.S. 412 (1915), which involved the Interstate Commerce Commission Act of
1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379, and several of its sections. Of importance here is section
14, 24 Stat. 384, which is based upon section 13, 24 Stat. 383. These two sections
set up an investigatory procedure by the commission, with an order eventuating. When
a carrier rejects such order then, under section 16, 24 Stat. 384, the commission or
any company or person interested in it may seek summary relief, by petition, in the
district court, which is then to hear and determine the matter. The 1889 amendments,
Act of March 2, 1889, ch. 382, 25 Stat. 855, are not material, and those of 1906,
Act of June 29, 1906, ch. 3591, 34 Stat. 584, revamped section 16 so as to make the
judicial proceeding proceed in all respects like other civil suits for damages, except that
the prima facie evidentiary aspect of the commission's order was continued. Such a
reparation proceeding before the commission is thus an "investigation" and not a quasijudicial required (statutorily mandated) hearing, and even if such a full hearing was
given by the agency this did not make it a constitutionally or statutorily required one,
i.e., it was not, therefore, a full hearing. Thus the district court's alleged de novo hearing was really not such.
15. This illustration takes the situation out of the question initially propounded,
whether the court is no longer acting judicially but legislatively. E.g., Keller v. Potomac Elec. Co., 261 U.S. 428 (1923); Keller v. American Eagle Fire Ins. Co., 169 F.2d
281 (D.C. Cir. 1948); see Manor Coal Co. v. Balchumas, 174 Md. 453, 199 A. 534
(1938). See text accompanying notes 19, 20 & 42 infra.
16. See, e.g., Federal Radio Comm'n v. General Elec. Co., 281 U.S. 464 (1930);
Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408 (1792). As a result of the General Electric
Co. case a new judicial review procedure was enacted, Act of July 1, 1930, ch. 288,
§ 16, 46 Stat. 844. See FCC v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266
(1933). For a similar case on the state level see American Beauty Homes Corp. v.
Louisville & Jefferson County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 379 S.W.2d 450 (Ky.
1964).
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though based on a substantial factual underpinning, nevertheless, may
be replaced by the reviewing court. 1 7 This type of "review" is often
characterized as a de novo one, but it is not, strictly speaking, that
which will be discussed here. As mentioned in the opening sentence
of this article de novo review is a court's ability to reject an agency's
findings, irrespective of the substantial evidence rule, and to remand
the case.
A more appropriate series of illustrations begins with the denial
or invasion of a person's constitutional rights, so that ordinarily a full
hearing is required before a final taking occurs, i.e., the field is now
a constitutional one. Historically, the hearing took place before a judicial body and preceded a physical taking. The exigencies of government, the growing nation and its economy, as well as other factors,"8
necessitated the proliferating use of regulatory agencies in not only
the legislative-executive fields but also the judicial field. 9 Thus, between a person and the courts there was now interposed an agency,
utilizing a process to ascertain and find the facts, which process the
judiciary also used; to the extent that the agency's findings of fact became conclusive under the substantial evidence rule, the agency exercised a judicial power, making the judiciary's reviewing power a limited one. 0 There were and still are permissible exceptions to this
approach, as where, for police power, emergency, war, or other reasons, a taking or impairment occurs first with the hearing thereafter
taking place in the agency or the court. 2 '
17. Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408 (1792), involved congressionallygranted pensions to Revolutionary War soldiers, but administered by the federal courts.
The same principle applies to the granting of relief to impoverished applicants. Borreson v. Department of Public Welfare, 368 Ill. 425, 14 N.E.2d 485 (1938).
18. See, e.g., Proceedings on the Death of Chief Justice White, 257 U.S. xxvxxvi (1922) (remarks by Chief Justice Taft).
19. In his dissent in Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S.
189, 210 (1928), Justice Holmes softens this idea by the use of the term "quasi."
20. For the distinction between process and power, and their combination as discussed see ADMINISTRATIVE LAw, supra note 1, at §§ 45-50. For the background and
citations to the basis for the doctrine of finality of fact see id. at § 254. Briefly,
findings are final and binding on the judiciary if and when supported by substantial
evidence on the whole record, and otherwise not objectionable.
21. A few illustrations of these exceptions may be given. The classic situation
is, of course, summary seizure and/or destruction where ordinarily the post-seizure
hearing is obtained in a court via a tort action. E.g., Adams v. Milwaukee, 228 U.S.
572 (1913); North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908). Similarly, property tax assessments are made without notice and hearing. Nickey v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 393 (1934). Nickey reasoned that because the only way the tax could
be collected was through a suit, then court proceedings were sufficient notice and hearing for these purposes. Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947), upheld Federal
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In this field of constitutional rights, a question now intrudes which
becomes important and meaningful in the context of a court's required
de novo review. To point up the question, we may reiterate that in
a nonconstitutional field there may ordinarily be no right of review
except as given by statute subject to the court's interpretation of
course. However, in a constitutional field, how can an agency, even
with congressional authority or command, be insulated from external
review without subordinating the Constitution to the rule of men?
The due process clause, for example, permits the taking of property
if, or on condition that, procedural due process is given.2 - But when
such a hearing is given, may a respondent nevertheless later contend
in a court that the hearing is not compatible with the minimum rights
constitutionally required,2 3 or can the procedure be quarantined from
judicial review? The answers must be yes and no respectively, because men and agencies are not above the law, and so Article I
courts always must be able to examine the record for these constitutional purposes. As Justice Brandeis once wrote: "The supremacy
of law demands that there shall be opportunity to have some court
decide whether an erroneous rule of law was applied; and whether
the proceeding in which [the] facts were adjudicated was conducted
regularly."24 This, in turn, also permits the judges to assert a presumption of reviewability, 25 not only for the reasons given but also
because our history and political and social ethic so disclose.26
Home Loan Bank regulations providing for a post-taking hearing where a conservator
took possession of a bank without notice. The Court stated that this "drastic procedure" was justified because of "the delicate nature of the institution and the impossibility of preserving credit during an investigation," as to whether the bank was conducting
its affairs in an unlawful, unauthorized and unsafe manner. Id. at 253. Finally,
Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944), is an example of a war-time holding that
a post-taking review statutorily provided for is good because of the exigencies of war
time conditions and the insistent demands of inflation control. Even in a nonwar
emergency situation this procedure could be upheld. E.g., Brown v. United States, 367
F.2d 907 (10th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 917 (1967).
22. For the meaning and content of this concept see ADMmISTRATIVE LAw, supra
note 1, at §§ 190-270. See notes 5 & 20 supra, and 26-27 infra. However, Justice
Frankfurter stated in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123,
162-63 (1951): "'[D]ue process,' unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances." Thus the content of the hearing, as required by procedural due process, may not only vary but its
timing also may vary. See note 21 supra.
23. This may be modified under the concepts illustrated in notes 21-22 supra.
24. St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 84 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
25. See text accompanying note 10 supra for the analogous aspect of statutory
preclusion of judicial review and the Court's interpretation.
26. JAFFE, supra note 13 at 336-53 utilizes this latter approach because of "the

March 1974]

REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATIONS

971

The question first propounded can now be clarified sufficiently
so as to explicate its meaning satisfactorily. The field is a constitutional one; Article III courts are being discussed; an agency's final determination is before these courts; that determination is the end result
of the agency's adjudicatory exercise of its quasi-judicial powers, i.e.,
a full hearing2' has preceded the order; the agency's final order is
supported by one or more findings of fact;28 the respondent assails
these findings for reasons now to be explored; the court, in reviewing
these findings, usually may support or remand because of the substantial evidence rule.2 9
If a statute permitted an Article I court to
disregard these findings entirely, delve into the evidentiary facts found
in the record, and, in addition, make and substitute its own findings
of fact for those of the agency, if and when the latter was exercising

a legislative power and function, then the statute would be unconstitutional because the court has now turned into and become a superagency or a legislatively functioning body. 30 If the Article III court,

however, whether because of a statutory or constitutional mandate,
went into the evidentiary facts as if it were trying the case itself, thus
disregarding the agency's findings and the substantial evidence rule,
but then could do nothing else but remand to the agency if it disagreed
with that body on its findings, the narrow and specific question to be
discussed sufficiently appears, although for our purposes we ignore the

statutory broadening save for illustrative purposes.
teaching of our history and tradition. It is our common law, and in a lesser measure
a corollary of our constitutions." Id. at 336. I would rather reverse these reasons,
and peg the corollary to the Federal Constitution and, at least, to the procedural due
process requirements of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See also K. DAVIS,
The Common Law of Reviewability, ADmNsTmAnvE IAw-TEXT § 28.02, at 509 (3d
ed. 1972).
27. The "full hearing" as required by statute was discussed in Morgan v. United
States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936). Morgan held that under the facts presented this required
a due process hearing according to the constitutional minimums. What these minimums were was not explicated, but other cases either discuss it generally, or speak of
one item in particular being required. E.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970);
Hecht v. Monaghan, 307 N.Y. 461, 121 N.E.2d 421 (1954). See note 22 supra.
28. See generally Schaffer Transp. Co. v. United States, 355 U.S. 83 (1957);
Colorado-Wyoming Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 626 (1945); New Jersey Bell Tel. Co.
v. Communications Workers of America, 5 N.J. 354, 75 A.2d 721 (1950). See also
Administrative Procedure Act § 8(b)(3)(A), 5 U.S.C. § 557(e)(3)(A) (1970). On
the final order aspects see note 3 supra.
29. See note 1 supra.
30. Although not required by the Constitution to conduct a full hearing when
it the agency, is acting quasi-legislatively, a statute may mandate it. Jordan v. American Eagle Fire Ins. Co., 169 F.2d 281 (D.C. Cir. 1948). See notes 18-19 supra.
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In light of the preceding, one answer to the question initially formulated is to point to three overall areas in which, half a century ago,
de novo review was granted,"' then to disclose that one of them, Crow-

ell v. Benson,32 has gone to a "deserved repose,

'33

that the second,

Borough,3 4

Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon
"has gradually died
and today is clearly not the law" and "seems not only dead but also
forgotten, ' 35 and that the third, Ng Fung Ho v. White,3 6 continues only
because of policy reasons. 7 Not all commentators agree with this assessment. One of them speaks of the second case as "still manag[ing]
to maintain a zombie-like existence in some of the states"; 3 8 and another analyzes the three cases in extenso, concluding that, as to the
second case, "the Supreme Court . . .has done a great deal to make
[its] doctrine innocuous in the situations in which it could do the most
damage, [but] has never expressly overruled it,"3 9 and that the other
two cases still retain vitality.4" But, as the Massachusetts Supreme
31. E.g, Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932) (workmen's compensation award
under the Longshoremen's & Harbor Workers Act); Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S.
276 (1922) (deportation case where a substantial claim of citizenship was made); Ohio
Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287 (1920) (state utility rate-making
case involving claim of confiscation because of too-low valuation).
32. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
33. Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 142 (1946) (Frankfurter, J.). The
Crowell decision "while never expressly overruled has not been followed (although its
ghost still haunts the books)." R. PARKER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 112 (1952) (citations
omitted). See also Merrill, Constitutional Fact: How Far Does Due Process Require
the Independent Judgment of Judges?, 2 CREIGHTON L. REV. 45 (1968).
34. 253 U.S. 287 (1920).
35. 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 167 (1958); see F. COOPER, ADMINIsTRATIvE AGENCIES AND THE CoURTs 314 (1951).
36.
37.

259 U.S. 276 (1922).
See note 31 supra and note 44 and accompanying text infra. Of course the

"policy" here referred to has a background of national history, mores, and all that combined to make up our character and outlook; the particular judicial reflection here
obviously flies in the face of solicitude for property, found in our constitutional and
legal documentary and decisional history (e.g., B. Twiss, LAWYERS AND THE CONSTIrUTION (1942)), but is a satisfactory exception on the basis of our concern for the individual and his pursuit of happiness, so that a logical inconsistency between Ng Fung

Ho and Ben Avon may be tolerated when the latter is completely rejected but not the
former. See Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948). See note 44 infra.
38. W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS
368 (5th ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as GELLHORN & BYSE].
39. JAFFE, supranote 12, at 651.
40. Id. at 637-38, 644-47 (on Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922)) and

638-51 (on Crowell v. Benson, 258 U.S. 22 (1932)). Jaffe never characterized these
cases as decrepit, rejected, or deceased; au contraire, the very length of the discussion
is proof of the author's feeling. For a criticism of Jaffe by Davis, see K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW TREATISE 173-74 (1958).
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Court said in 1952, "we would prefer to see the death certificate,"41
while another commentator utilizes analogous views on a wait-and-see
attitude. 42 The late James M. Landis criticized all three cases and
felt that the minority views in two should become law, but apparently
that Ng Fung Ho v. White,4 3 the third deportation policy case, was
acceptable because "the issue of citizenship is triable in a simple manner. Little in the way of expertness is demanded for its determination. The record of facts that underlies its establishment is a simple
44
...
one.
An understanding of these cases requires a short analysis of two
terms, "constitutional" and "jurisdictional" fact. These are used by
judges and commentators, sometimes interchangeably and sometimes
differently, and, in the latter situation, sometimes without giving a
clear understanding of why. For example, Ng Fung Ho found Brandeis, for a unanimous court, speaking of
the claim of citizenship being thus a denial of an essential
jurisdictional fact. . . . If the jurisdiction of the [agency] may
not be tested in the courts [on such a claim, where the respondent] makes a showing that his claim is not frivolous, then obviously deportation of a resident may follow upon a purely executive
order whatever his race or place of birth. 45
41. Opinion of the Justices, 328 Mass. 679, 683, 106 N.E.2d 259, 262 (1952).
For the divisions among the state courts see, K. DAvis, ADMnTISTRATVE LAW TREATISE
179 (1958), who terms their opinions "confused" and "ambiguous." See also GELLHORN & BYSE, supra note 38, at 369; JAFFE, supra note 12, at 368.
42.
HART, AN INrRODUCTION To ADMINISTRATVE LAW: WrrH SELECtED
CASEs 711-14, 716 n.53 (2d ed. 1950). Obviously, much has occurred since then.
43. 259 U.S. 276 (1922).
44. J.I.ANDIS, THE ADmmSsm =nvn
Paocnss 143 (1938). He distinguished between the rate-making (Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough) and the deportation (Ng Fung Ho) cases on three grounds, namely, that the minority opinions in
the former explained that administrative agencies do not "transact their [quasi-judicial]
business in a manner similar to courts," that the "right involved is more than a property right; it is the right to liberty of person," and, lastly, the reason given in the
text to his note. Id. Brandeis, in Ng Fung Ho, specifically made this second policy
distinction: 'To deport one who so [substantidlly shows and] claims to be a citizen
obviously deprives him of liberty . . . [and] [m]ay result also in loss of both property
and life; or of all that makes life worth living." 259 U.S. at 284. See also Brandeis'
language in later opinions: e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 90 n.26 (1932) (dis.
senting opinion), and St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 77
(1936) (concurring opinion). The Justice's language in these two cases has been characterized respectively as "a determined if not altogether convincing attempt to explain
the [Ng Fung Ho] case away," and "stressing a supposed distinction 'between the right
of liberty of person and other constitutional rights."' GELHoRN & Bysn, supra note
38, at 371-72.
45. Ng Fung Ho v.White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922). Itisnot unimportant
here to note that Ng Fung Ho and United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253 (1905)

J.
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One commentator says of this opinion that "[t]hus was born the 'jurismay be compared somewhat, and that the former may also be clarified. The cases
were seventeen years apart, with only Holmes, McKenna, and Day sitting on both (majority, each time, with Holmes writing the Ju Toy opinion).
In lu Toy, Justice Brewer's (Peckham joining) dissenting opinion (Day also dissented) inveighed against "the action of a ministerial officer . . . without trial by jury
and without judicial examination." 198 U.S. at 269. His language was perhaps the
inspiration for Brandeis' Ng Fung Ho comments. See note 44 supra. But, factually,
Ju Toy's petition for a writ of habeas corpus was, felt Holmes, highly insufficient "because it alleged nothing but citizenship" and, since it did not make out a prima facie
case, "[the] petition should have been denied on this ground.......
198 U.S. at 261.
However, he went into the other contentions and rejected them all, in effect holding
that a person seeking admission, even on the claim of citizenship by birth and a temporary absence with presen) intention to return, had no due process or other right to
a judicial trial, and that because of the power of Congress to pass exclusion laws the
decision to admit or exclude "may be entrusted [i.e., delegated] to an executive officer
and .. .his decision is due process of law ......
Id. at 263. Holmes thus followed
earlier decisions that the exclusion acts made final the agency's determinations "whatever the ground on which the right to enter the country is claimed-as well when it
is citizenship" or other grounds. Id. at 262. This in-out distinction, insofar as a citizen is concerned, is constitutionally silly, but, on the facts, all that Holmes says in
this area is, for this case, obiter dictum. There is no reason why it need be followed,
even though Brandeis did. And note may be taken of Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367,
372 (1962) that under the amended immigration statutes a nonresident may obtain
a judicial trial in the district court of his status via the Declaratory Judgment Act,
28 U.S.C. § 2201, and on the basis of Administrative Procedure Act §§ 10, 12, 5 U.S.C.
§§ 559, 702-03 (1970).
The case of Ng Fung Ho, supra, involved four Chinese, Ng Fung Ho and his
son as one couple and Gin Sang Get and (apparently) his brother as a second couple.
As to the first couple, they never claimed citizenship, were resident aliens who had
(allegedly) obtained their admission by fraud (and were also laborers who had remained without possession of a certificate of residence) in violation of the 1892 Chinese Exclusion Act, and were therefore subject to deportation by executive proceedings
and order under the 1917 Act (which applied, instead of the earlier act giving a judicial
hearing, because the petitioners had remained beyond its effective date and this was
a separate offense). 259 U.S. at 281. It is interesting that Brandeis referred to the
fact that "[tihere is a faint contention, which we deem unfounded, that the petitioners
were not given a fair [administrative] hearing and that there is no evidence to sustain
the findings of the immigration official." Id. at 278. In other words a quasi-judicial
"fair" hearing was had, but Ng Fung Ho now sought a second judicial or de novo
hearing.
As to the second couple, a different problem arose. "Each claims to be a foreiguborn son of a native-born citizen" and therefore a United States citizen, so that "Congress was without power to authorize their deportation by executive order." Id. at 28182. Brandeis said that if: (a) they had been seeking admission then Ju Toy's holding
would apply and they could not be "entitled . . .under the Constitution to a judicial
hearing" after the executive proceedings; however, (b) they were not in Ju Toy's or
Ng Fung Ho's position, as they had arrived at San Francisco regularly, had been examined, etc., and then "ordered admitted as citizens. They then applied for and received their certificates of identity. Fifteen months after the entry of one and six
months after the entry of the other, both were arrested" and a deportation order issued
after the "fair hearing" mentioned above. Id. at 282. Their petitions for a writ fol-
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dictional fact' doctrine.14 6 Perhaps another portion of the opinion
should also be given, for here, as will shortly be seen, the correct jurisdictional fact appears somewhat more clearly: "Jurisdiction in the exe-

cutive to order deportation exists only if the person arrested is an
alien.

' 47

The two types of fact4" are illustrated in the quotations just given.
We may say that the constitutional one stems from the citizenship
clause, found in the Fourteenth Amendment's first section, first sentence: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and
of the State wherein they reside." Federal citizenship is here predicated on two items, namely, birth or naturalization, plus federal subjection, which equals federal citizenship; and this federal citizenship,
plus residence in a state, then make for state citizenship. For federal
purposes we can ignore the latter and concentrate on only the birth

or naturalization aspect.
Whether or not a person is born or naturalized is a question of
fact, and the established fact, found in the Constitution as an objective basis for citizenship, may now be termed a constitutional fact.
This type of fact is not an orphan; there are other objective facts in
the Constitution upon which a person may claim constitutional rights,
e.g., Article I, section 2, clause 12 gives the elements required as a
condition for becoming a representative, namely, twenty-five years of
age, seven years a citizen of the United States, and, when elected,
an inhabitant of the state in which chosen. These three items cannot
be impaired by adding other requirements as a condition to being
lowed, with Brandeis then commenting on their substantial showing of citizenship at
the deportation hearing and now in the petition, and holding that jurisdiction in the
congressional delegatee (executive department head) to deport required the fact of
alienage, which could now be tried judicially.
46. GELLHORN & BYSE, supra note 38, at 370.
47. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922).
48. There are numerous other types of fact to which attention might be called,
but these others are not relevant to our discussion. For example, in pleading a cause
of action the question at common law, in England and the United States, and even
today in many states, was and is whether, e.g., evidentiary, material, ultimate, conclusory, or other analogous facts should be pleaded. The reform movement touched not
only the states but also the federal courts. For example, the 1963 New York Civil
Practice Law and Rules § 3014 requires only "plain and concise statements in consecutively numbered paragraphs." For a discussion of this section, see ADINisTRATIvE
LAw, supra note 1, at 387; CARMODY & FORKOSCH, NEW YoRK PRACTICE 305-16 (8th
ed. 1963). Also see FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) which requires only "a short and plain
statement of the claim," and the "official" forms appended under FED. R. Civ. P. 84.
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seated when an election has already been duly held and won;4 9 so,
too, the Congress or agency cannot impair the rights of a federal citizen once the objective requirements of the citizenship clause have
been met.
In this respect, therefore, Ng Fung Ho states that a fact, also
found in the Constitution, must be followed to its logical end once
it is established; or, and especially because of the presumption of reviewability discussed above, where any such consequence is denied
or impaired, the courts must be able to review the agency conduct
now attacked without being circumscribed by that agency's fact determinations, otherwise the constitutional right becomes merely another
legal (common law or statutory) right (although, as Ng Fung Ho diszcloses, also remanded for agency action in accordance with the court's
views). Or, put differently, where the constitutional fact exists then
the agency does not have the power, authority, or jurisdiction to deport, i.e., the existence of the two simultaneously is incompatible.
The latter, however, would exist if the former did not, so that if the
fact of alienage existed then the fact of jurisdiction to deport would
exist. This last fact may now be termed a jurisdictional fact, which
gives the agency authority to act." This approach is found in other
situations which also further clarify Ng FungHo.
These other situations may be illustrated in several ways. For
example, a contingent delegation is ordinarily one in which the delegator does not create immediately any agency but does, in effect, permit one to hang in limbo. The method is to enact legislation, where
Congress is the delegator, in which it is provided that, upon the future
occurrence of a particular fact, the delegation is to become effective,
e.g., in the event of war the President is authorized in "stand-by" legislation to do many things. 51 Or Congress may provide that "if the President finds" an arms embargo "may contribute to the reestablishment
of peace between" two warring nations, and he "make[s] a proclamation to that effect, it shall [then] be unlawful to sell" to either such
49. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
50. Although we here discuss the term "jurisdictional fact" without overmuch of
analysis, this does not mean that it is a simple concept. In Estep v. United States,
327 U.S. 114, 142 (1946), Justice Frankfurter referred to "the casuistic difficulties
spawned by the doctrine of 'jurisdictional fact'....." Jaffe's extended discussion used
the term "main facts," as well as "crucial facts." JAFFE, supra note 12, at 634-35.
51. War ordinarily requires an act of Congress under its war-making powers, but
it may occur automatically when the United States is attacked, e.g., as happened in 1941
with the assault upon Pearl Harbor, but still require legislative implementation for this
country to be at war with Germany.
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This type of contingent delegation brings into focus a "pure" jurisdictional fact, without which no agency or power springs forth as from
the dragon's teeth of Jason, and without which any attempt to exercise
power may be judicially squelched. This is the situation even though
the putative delegatee may himself be the instrument used by the delegator to ascertain the fact upon which his own power depends, i.e., the contingent delegatee has the power to determine he has power.5" Put differently, that delegatee has a preliminary (implied) type of jurisdiction for
one narrow purpose only, and his authority and power are thus severely
circumscribed in relation to the general authority and powers conferred
on a condition subsequent to the existence and finding of that jurisdictional fact.54 Analogically, therefore, but in one sense different from
the preceding type of jurisdictional fact, the Ng Fung Ho case discloses
that the agency is already in existence, is functioning, and has power
and authority to hold hearing, etc.; but, in the case of a substantially
proved claim of citizenship on the record, no authority to deport then
exists, i.e., the agency's jurisdiction to deport is subject to the existence
of the factual constitutional status of the respondent. This is why Justice Brandeis referred to such status as a yes-or-no jurisdictional basis
for action when he wrote that "citizenship [is] a denial of an essential
52. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 312 (1936)
(quoting from a Joint Resolution of Congress); see J.W. Hampton & Co. v. United
States, 276 U.S. 394, 407 (1928); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 693 (1892); Cargo
of the Brig Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382 (1813); ADmiNisTRATr
LAw, supra note 1, §§ 92, 342.
53. This is analogous in reverse to situations where a court, issuing a temporary
injunction, has jurisdiction to determine it has no jurisdiction, albeit during its temporary acquisition of jurisdiction its orders must be obeyed otherwise contempt proceedings may be upheld. E.g., United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258 (1947).
The actual existence of that jurisdictional fact may, of course, be inquired into
regardless of any finding or claim, i.e., the judiciary is not bound by any substantial
evidence or other rule. For example, in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579 (1952) (Steel Seizure Case), President Truman required Secretary Sawyer
to seize the steel mills, the former claiming that a labor dispute threatened to disrupt
the production of steel required for munitions in the Korean "War." The former's
power was further claimed to be not only an inherent one but also authorized by
clauses in the Constitution and by legislation. However, such claims were rejected by
the High Court. While no contingent delegation is involved, this case indicates the
scope of inquiry indulged in by the courts, i.e., a full and complete one because no
hearing had ever been had by the companies before now. See note 21 supra.
54. One might say the jurisdictional finding of fact is a condition precedent to
the exercise of the general power. Or that this general power sleeps until awakened
by the emergency, as, analogically if not similarly, was said in Home Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Case).
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jurisdictional fact," or "[l]urisdiction . . . exists only if the person arrested is an alien." 5 5
An illustration which superficially appears also to be a contingent
one involves a summary seizure or destruction case. For example,
Justice Holmes, while on the bench in Massachusetts and construing
a particular statute, wrote that "the authority and jurisdiction of the
commissioners [under the statute] to condemn the plaintiff's horse
. . . was conditional upon its actually having the glanders." 5 6 In another case Justice Peckham stated that "[t]he right to so seize and
destroy is, of course, based upon the fact that the food is not fit to
be eaten. '57 But this "fact-plus" situation does not equate completely
with a pure contingent delegation. Here, as in Ng Fung Ho, the public official generally has powers given to him, i.e., he is in existence
as an agency, and then immediately has jurisdiction to act in many
ways, such as entering upon premises, requesting inspections, perhaps
obtaining subpoenas. 58 While exercising his general jurisdiction, he
makes a finding of fact concerning the material so inspected, namely,
that it is "bad." At that point he is now ordinarily further authorized
to seize, condemn, and destroy, with his particular and further subsequent power or jurisdiction so to do contingent upon his prior finding
of fact (a condition precedent). The analogy to this second type of
contingent delegation may also be found in rate-making, where the
agency ordinarily must first find that the existing rates are unreasonable, whereupon it then has additional power and jurisdiction given
to it to continue further and find and make reasonable rates. In other
words, practically every delegation contains internal conditions or contingencies before additional power to hear or determine or order may
be exercised, whereas the first type examined involves a condition or
fact external to the agency-which has not yet actually come into existence-before any power whatever may be exercised, except to ascertain the existence of the external fact itself.
These external and internal types of jurisdictional fact may look
alike but it is apparent that in the first one the courts cannot be bound
55. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922).
56. Miller v. Horton, 152 Mass. 540, 543, 26 N.E. 100, 103 (1891).
57. North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306, 315 (1908).
See note 21 supra.
58. On the need for and upholding of a subpoena by such an analogous official,
see Oklahoma Press Pub]. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946) (under the F.L.S.A.
of 1938); Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501 (1943) (under the WalshHealey Act). On application of the Fourth Amendment, see See v. Seattle, 387 U.S.
541 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
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by any rule of evidence which circumscribes their authority to inquire
into the actuality of the external fact (especially as no hearing of any
sort has yet been held, and as otherwise men, not law, would rule);
the second type may analogically be compared to the usual, ordinary,
everyday facts which one finds adjudicated in courts and agencies
throughout the country, 9 so that a limited type of evidentiary review
as to them may now ordinarily be sanctioned by the courts; 60 but in
contrast to the particular type of fact discussed in Ng Fung Ho, all
these others, whether internal or external as just discussed, are not
found in the Constitution; therein lies the difference. It is this type
of constitutional incorporation (perhaps via judicial interpretation)
which lies at the base of our opening question.
For example, in the first of the three cases originally mentioned
in which de novo review was granted, Crowell v. Benson, 61 both the
majority and dissenting opinions clashed over the question whether the
federal judicial power was being subverted by depriving it of the jurisdictional ability independently and finally to determine "the existence
of the facts upon which the enforcement of the constitutional rights
of the citizen depend. ' '62 For us, however, two other (related) questions were involved: whether "the injury occur[red] upon the navigable waters of the United States and whether the relation of master
and servant exist[ed]." 63 The second master-servant-relation question of fact may perhaps be likened to the ordinary, everyday facts
mentioned above, i.e., the substantial evidence rule should apply,
while the first may conceivably be looked at differently, 4 though Chief
Justice Hughes joined them together:
[D]eterminations of fact are fundamental or "jurisdictional," in
59. These everyday facts may also be denominated in other ways: "simple, external, physical event as to which there is conflicting testimony." O'Leary v. BrownPacific-Maxon, Inc., 340 U.S. 504, 507 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.); evidentiary facts, e.g.,
the "evidence [which] must be taken and weighed, both as to its accuracy and credibility . . . ." Saginaw Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 96 F.2d 554, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1938),
cert. denied sub nom. Gross v. Saginaw Broadcasting Co., 305 U.S. 613 (1938); adjudicative facts, K. DAvIs, AD nmmsTRATa LAw-TnxT 160 (3d ed. 1972); "raw facts,"
NLRB v. Marcus Trucking Co., 286 F.2d 583, 590 (2d Cir. 1961); "factual evidence,"
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S. 1, 28 (1937).
60. Of course in the ordinary summary seizure or destruction case, the method
of review is by a tort action in the courts, so that no agency order may be involved
for purposes of review; but if the agency did hold a hearing prior to destruction, then
would not the limited substantial evidence review apply?
61. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
62. Id. at 56.
63. Id. at 55.
64. Compare notes 73-74 infra.

[Vol. 25

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

the sense that their existence is a condition precedent to the operation of the statutory scheme.

These fundamental requirements

[here are that the injury-navigable waters combination, and the
employment relation] exist. These conditions are indispensable
• . . because the power of the Congress to enact the legislation
turns upon the existence of these conditions.

In amending and revising the maritime law, the Congress
cannot reach beyond the constitutional limits which are inherent
in the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.

Unless the injuries to

which the Act relates occur upon the navigable waters of the
United States, they fall outside that jurisdiction. Not only is navigability itself a question of fact . . . but, where the navigability

is not in dispute, the locality of the injury, that is, whether it has

occurred upon the navigable waters of the United States, determines the existence of the congressional power to create the liability prescribed by the statute. 65

The Chief Justice lumped several items into what may be termed
a hortatory plea for a de novo review, and it is instructive to analyze
the navigation base. Ever since Gibbons v. Ogden," navigation and
65. 285 U.S. at 54-55 (citations omitted). The opinion continued: "Again, it
cannot be maintained that the Congress has any general authority to amend the maritime law so as to establish liability without fault in maritime cases regardless of particular circumstances or relations [and] some suitable selection would be required [as
statutorily here] only where the relation of master and servant exists ....
Mhe
fact of that relation is the pivot of the statute and, in the absence of any other justification, underlies the constitutionality of this enactment. If the person injured was not
an employee . . . or if the injury did not occur upon the navigable waters . . . there
is no ground . . . that the person . . . could constitutionally be subjected, in the ab-

sence of fault upon his part, to the liability which the statute creates." Id. at 55-57.
However, even conceding the constitutional fact-navigable waters combination to be
analogous to the contingent type of delegation discussed above, does not the masterservant relationship follow as to the internal, not external, jurisdictional requirement?
Cf. O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 340 U.S. 504 (1951).
"In relation to these basic facts," continued the Crowell Court, "the question is
not the ordinary one as to the propriety of provision for administrative determinations
. * ,,It
is the question whether the Congress may substitute for constitutional courts,
in which the judicial power of the United States is vested, an administrative agency
. . . for the final determination of the existence of the facts upon which the enforcement of the constitutional rights of the citizens depend .

. .

.

That would be to sap

the judicial power as it exists under the Federal Constitution, and to establish a government of a bureaucratic character alien to our system, wherever fundamental rights depend, as not infrequently they do depend, upon the facts, and finality as to facts becomes in effect finality in law." 285 U.S. at 56-57. This aspect of so-called constitutional fact (flowing from the judicial power in Article II) somehow rings hollow. For
if logically extended there is practically little in the federal administrative jurisdiction
which cannot be included under this new scope of review. That this is not the current
approach is found not only throughout the citations and references given herein, but
also in the two Chenery cases, SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943) and SEC
v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947), which are discussed extensively in AmnmIsTRATrIvE LAw, supra note 1, at 469-73.
66. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1 (1824). Chief Justice Marshall held that navigation
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navigable waters have been included within the federal congressional
and judicial powers, both positively and negatively, so as to exercise
control.67 In other words, navigation and the commerce clause are
one, at least insofar as commerce in this aspect includes the fact of
navigation, so that the Chief Justice might conceivably and even logically urge that the fact be dubbed a constitutional one. There is, however, one difference between Crowell and Ng Fung Ho, namely, the
fact of citizenship is directly, expressly, and objectively given in the
Constitution (just as are the requirements for all congressmen and the
president),68 whereas the fact of navigation and navigable waters is
indirectly, impliedly, and subjectively so judicially interpreted. The
Ogden court might well have interpreted the clause and the case differently (and there was strong preference for this), but it requires
language distortion to misinterpret "born or naturalized" ("subject to
the jurisdiction" does, one must confess, lend itself to interpretation
and application, but Ng Fung Ho was concededly within this phrase

at that time).
Continuing with the Crowell opinion, we may go even so far as
to concede, arguendo, Hughes's next proposition that "whether [the
injury] occurred upon the navigable waters of the United States determines the existence of the congressional power to" act-assuming,
however, that no other federal powers exist which can be called upon
for such a purpose.6 9 In this overall syllogistic reasoning, the Chief
Justice could well have validly concluded that to give an agency final
say "would be to sap the judicial power. . . and to establish a government of a bureaucratic character" which would deprive persons of their
constitutional rights without recourse to the independent judiciary."0
In the light of the Ng Fung Ho analysis, this follows, and it is instrucis commerce, that ships plying between New York and New Jersey on the Hudson River were in interstate commerce and that the federal power under the commerce clause
attached so as to negate the ability of a state unduly to control such commerce-navigation.

67. See, e.g., M. FoRaoscH, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw chap. X (2d ed. 1969)
[hereinafter cited as CONSTITUTIONAL LAW].
68.

Between 1789 and 1804, when the Constitution became effective and the

Twelfth Amendment was ratified, the vice-president's qualifications were not constitutionally provided for; it is in that amendments last sentence that this oversight was
corrected.

69.

285 U.S. at 55.

See, for example, the manner in which Chief Justice Mar-

shall toyed with the several clauses referred to in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat) 316 (1819), and Justice Douglas's use of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth
and Ninth Amendments to find the "penumbral" right to privacy had now become a

constitutional right. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
70. 285 U.S. at 57.
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tive to note that the Crowell majority opinion quotes from this case
for this jurisdictional purpose and support. 7 ' But even on these concessions there now intrudes a question of policy, namely, whether or
not these types of jurisdictional problems cannot be resolved administratively, subject to the substantial evidence-whole record review by
the courts. For example, if the courts were to grant de novo reviews
in all these situations there would be a mountain of case lava erupting,
descending upon, and burying the judiciary. Too many agencies, regulatory and nonregulatory, depend for their life and living upon the
power of Congress under the commerce clause, and there is no valid
reason why agencies cannot, in the first instance, go into these facts
with a limited review following. 72 This is what the Supreme Court
in effect decided by applying the exhaustion doctrine to labor board
unfair labor practice proceedings, because, even though "the Board
has jurisdiction only if the complaint concerns interstate or foreign
commerce," the statute's "judicial review so provided is adequate" and,
on review, there will be a rejection if the reviewing court concludes
"that such finding was without adequate evidence to support it
... . 9973 Of course, nothing here conclusively indicates that the review will not be a de novo one, but it is established that even on
this fact the substantial evidence rule applies. 4
71. Id. at 61. See also id. at 60, quoting Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon
Borough, 253 U.S. 207 (1920).
72. That is what happened in Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. O'Leary, 288 F.2d 542
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 817 (1961).
73. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938).
74. See, e.g., Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951); NLRB
v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58 (1937); NLRB v. Fruehauf Trailer
Co., 301 U.S. 49 (1937); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). In
Friedman and Fruehauf supra, the Chief Justice said that the Board had made findings
of fact concerning "the nature of the respondent's business," and then immediately held
that these were "supported by the evidence." 301 U.S. at 75; 301 U.S. at 57. In
Jones & Laughlin, he felt that whether or not the steel company's actions brought it
under federal control "lie[s] within the authority conferred upon the Board, [and] is
left by the statute to be determined as individual cases arise." 340 U.S. at 32. Referring to the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970), specifically
the standards set out in § 10(e), the Chief Justice stated that the Board's "findings
as to the facts are to be conclusive, but only if supported by evidence . .

.

. [Upon]

review all questions of the jurisdiction of the Board and the regularity of its proceedings, all questions of constitutional right or statutory authority, are open to examination
by the court," . . . and that here the "facts found by the Board support its order and
the evidence supports the findings." Id. at 47.
The original statutory admonition in § 10(e) was that "[tihe findings cf the
Board as to the facts, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive." National Labor
Relations Act, 49 Stat. 454 (1935). This 1935 statutory formula of "supported by evidence" was followed practically verbatim in the three labor cases of 1937. By the

March 19741

REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATIONS

983

All this conduces strongly to a bifurcated Caeser-God arrangement where the judicial God ordinarily reviews all questions of law
without restrictions, similarly ascertains whether pure contingent-affirmative-jurisdictional or prohibitory-negative-jurisdictional 75 provisions are followed 76 and also enters the internal fact-finding functions
of an existing agency, but only to see whether the agency has arrogated
such power beyond its inferred competence, that is, there must be
substantial evidence on the whole record to support the agency's findings of fact. 77 This arrangement, we have seen, is not only a necessary one in the face of modem economic and political needs, as well
following year the "adequate evidence" approach was used in Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938), and just two volumes of reports later in that same
year the Supreme Court judicially interpreted the phrase into "substantial evidence."
Thus, by 1939 Stone could write that the 1935 statute, as by then interpreted, required
"a substantial basis of fact . . ." NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co.,
306 U.S. 292, 299 (1939). In 1946, the Administrative Procedure Act's § 10(e)(5),
as a general approach and as applied to all covered agencies, expanded the phrase into
the whole record rule (in two separate sentences here combined), i.e., substantial evidence on the whole record, so that in the following year the amendments to the Wagner Act could now include that phrase, i.e., "[t]he findings of the Board with respect
to questions of fact if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as
a whole shall be conclusive." Amendments of the National Labor Relations Act, 61
Stat. 148 (1947). However, even under the former language and throughout the years
the courts in effect applied this substantial evidence-whole record rule. Forkosch, Has
the "Whole Record" Formula Superseded the "SubstantialEvidence" Rule?, 3 LAB. LJ.
455, 519 (1952). In Jones & Laughlin, supra, the majority and dissenting opinions
devoted numerous pages to an exhaustive analysis of the evidentiary facts to ascertain,
as noted above, whether the findings of fact were "supported by the evidence," taking
into account the pros and cons just as the substantial evidence rule on the whole record
admonished.
75. See Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958). See note 12 supra.
76. In summary seizure cases, note 21 supra, the agency (official) is in existence
and proceeding to conduct investigations, but cannot seize or destroy without the existence of one fact. This determination is made without any hearing. The subsequent
action (in tort for destruction, perhaps for a declaratory judgment or injunction where
seized and held) is the first hearing, and in this court trial the judiciary has complete
power to determine, make, and enforce its own findings of fact.
77. See, e.g., ADMINsITRATIvE LAw, supra note 1, § 246c at 403 et seq., and §
257 [the Whole Record Formula] at 458-59, for a detailed description and analysis
of the fact-finding process, together with the inability of an agency to make any finding
where evidence therefore is lacking, or any finding other than "x" where the only evidence is to that effect (official notice to the contrary is absent, and the finding and
evidence are not inherently improbable), and the in-between situations where several
different findings concerning one fact are available, all supported substantially on the
whole record, even though one finding may be the strongest and another the weakest,
with the agency's choice here being final and binding on the court, although in the
ordinary review a court might well reject the one finding adopted by the agency as
being not substantially supported by now being compelled to remand for the agency
to make another finding, or reopen the hearing, or even dismiss.
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as the judiciary's inability otherwise to cope with its own mounting
caseload, but also permits a functioning partnership s to divide the judicial workload and still maintain the supremacy of the law unimpaired.
In other words, let the agency-Caeser obtain and build upon its
substantially supported findings of fact unless its jurisdiction qua existence is expressly found in the Constitution as a limitation or, e.g.,
a [citizenship] grant; and even in this latter situation questions of judicial and political policy must also enter. 79 Perhaps one reason for
Crowell, Ben Avon, and Ng Fung Ho may be the innate conservatism
of lawyers and judges which prevents them from straying too far afield,
and that it is only with comprehension and experience that the consequences of permitting substantially supported findings of fact to become final are seen as not too onerous or unable to be accepted and
absorbed; 0 it is therefore to be expected that immediate judicial capitulation to the new is not warranted in the light of history and politics."' In other words, the triumvirate of exceptions could well be
expressly rejected today, especially since rate-making and workmen's
compensation have come a long way legislatively, administratively, and
judically without any earthshaking consequences. Even in deportation
cases, the requirement that the respondent "make a showing that his
claim is not frivolous" and is also "supported before the agency and
in the petition for habeas corpus"8 2 shows that on the substantial evidence-whole record rule the court would reject any contrary finding.
78.

"It will bear repeating that although the administrative process has had a dif-

ferent development and pursues somewhat different ways from
are to be deemed collaborative instrumentalities of justice and the
ence of each should be respected by the other." United States
409, 422 (1941) (Frankfurter, J.). Justice Stone earlier said the
States v. Morgan, 307 U.S. 183, 191 (1939).

those of courts, they
appropriate independv. Morgan, 313 U.S.
same thing in United

See also ADMINIsTRATIVE LAW, supra

note 1, § 302, dealing with the primary jurisdiction doctrine which emphasizes this
view.

Perhaps the later approach under the Crowell statute in O'Leary v. Brown-Pa-

cific-Maxon, Inc., 340 U.S. 504, 506-07 (1951), discloses the more enlightened view of
workmen's compensation in general. This may spill over into an outright rejection of
Crowell rather than a strict limitation to its fact situation.
79. For example, even though the judiciary has jurisdiction it may still reject it
because of the doctrine of the political question, a judicial invention in which policy
plays the most important role. See, e.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969);
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 67, at 73-74.
80. See notes 110-112 infra and accompanying text.

81.

For an excellent analysis of the way in which the Supreme Court interpreted

the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in the late nineteenth century,

due to the arguments and needs of the corporations and their lawyers, see B. Twiss,
LAwYERS AND THE CONSTrrTION (1942).
82. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922).
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M
Although Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough and

Crowell v. Benson may now be labeled anachronisms which should
be overruled, with Ng Fung Ho v. White continuing only for policy and

simplicity reasons, there is one basis given for a de novo review which
has not yet been mentioned. That reason involves Ben Avon's use
of the term "confiscation." The facts in that case showed that the
Pennsylvania Public Service Commission valued the company's (plaintiff in error) property at $924,744 and fixed water rates so as to result
in a 7 percent return on that dollar figure; the state's intermediate
court increased the value to $1,324,621.80 and remanded so that the

agency could fix rates on this new valuation.8"

The state's supreme

court now reversed because "there was competent evidence to sustain

the Commission's conclusion, and no abuse of discretion appeared."8
The United States Supreme Court rejected this conclusion, being itself
compelled to conclude that the Supreme Court [erroneously] interpreted the statute as withholding from the courts power to determine the question of confiscation according to their independent
judgment when85the action of the Commission comes to be considered on appeal.
83. Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287 (1920). According to the dissenting opinion by Brandeis (Holmes and Clarke joining), the intermediate "court, passing upon the weight of the evidence introduced before the Commission,
found that larger amounts should have been allowed for several items which entered
into the valuation, reversed the order on that ground, and directed the Commission
to reform its valuation accordingly and upon such revised valuation to fix a schedule
of rates which would yield the net return which it had found to be fair ... Mhe
Commission appealed .. .contending that the superior court had in passing upon the
weight of the evidence exceeded its jurisdiction. The [state] supreme court sustained
this contention.. . ." Id. at 292.
84. Id. at 288.
85. Id. at 289. While a state's interpretation of its own statute is binding on
the U.S. Supreme Court (Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 688
(1959); Guaranty Trust Co. v. Blodgett, 287 U.S. 509, 513 (1933)), this does not
mean that the statute-cum-gloss may not now be cast against the federal constitutional
clause to determine whether the combination is or is not to be upheld; what may sometimes occur is that the state statute has not yet been interpreted, so that the federal
courts may find it necessary to do this. E.g., Wichita R.R. & Light Co. v. PUC, 260
U.S. 48 (1922). Although this interpretation was later rejected by the Kansas Supreme Court in Consolidated Flour Mills Co. v. Kansas Gas & Elec. Co., 119 Kan.
47, 237 P. 1037 (1925). See also De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580-81
(1956); Cooper v. American Airlines, Inc., 149 F.2d 355, 359 (2d Cir. 1945) (Jerome
Frank's test). In Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 212 (1960), the Court
referred to the Florida legislation "which permits a federal court to certify such a
doubtful question of state law to the Supreme Court of Florida for its decision," an
approach today permitted in few jurisdictions.
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The reason given for this view was superficially quite simple:
The order here involved prescribed a complete schedule of
maximum future rates and was legislative in character. .

.

. In

all such cases, if the owner claims confiscation of his property will
result, the State must provide a fair opportunity for submitting that
issue to a judicial tribunal for determination upon its own independent judgment as to both law and facts; otherwise the order
is void because in conflict with the due process clause, Fourteenth
Amendment.8 6
The minority of three, led by Justice Brandeis, rejected the arguments of both parties concerning the scope of review afforded by the
state courts,8 7 felt these arguments "overlook the nature of the question of law which was under review," 8 set forth three such questions,
and then said:
[The state supreme court] held that the superior court did not
have revisory legislative powers, but only the power to review
questions of law-in the present case, whether there was [substantial] evidence on which the valuation adopted could reasonably
have been found .

.

.

. It, therefore, reinstated the order of the

Commission. But it did not do so as an appellate court reviewing
on the weight of the evidence findings of fact made by the superior
court. It did so solely because the only question before it was
whether there was substantial evidence to support the finding of
value; for if the valuation was legally arrrived at, the order was
confessedly reasonable ...
Therefore, the judgment of the [state] supreme court . . .
must be affirmed unless, as contended, the claim of confiscation
compels this court to decide, upon the weight of the evidence,
whether or not its property has been undervalued ....
[O]n that question the contention is that the court failed to
give due weight to the evidence adduced by the company ....
The objections to the valuation made by the company raise no
question of law but concern pure matters of fact; and the finding
of the Commission, affirmed by the highest court of the state, is
conclusive upon this court.8 9
In Ben Avon there were several other sections of the statute involved. 253 U.S.
at 290-91.
86. 253 U.S. at 289 (citations omitted).
87. Id. at 295-96.
88. Id. at 296.
89. Id. at 296-99 (citations omitted). Brandeis spent a page and a half urging
that, because the company had chosen to use a writ of error to bring the matter to
the High Court, only the substantial evidence question, and not the weight of evidence,
could be argued-and since there was such substantial evidence present, then there

should be affirmance. Id. at 298-99.
The deleted material here involved the additional contention that the state commission had used different processes "from that often pursued by courts and administrative
bodies," an argument Brandeis squelched by quoting the state supreme court: "The as-
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The bone of contention between the two Ben Avon opinion writers may be put into focus seriatim: (1) The ordinary rate-making
proceeding engaged in by an agency usually9" involves two questions,
i.e., whether the existing rates are unreasonable, and then, if they are,
what the reasonable ones should be. (2) The first question requires
the exercise of a quasi-judicial power, whereas the second question
requires a quasi-legislative one. (3) Ordinarily, in this constitutional
field, even though the agency might be required to hold a quasi-judicial hearing before its final determination of the first question, no such
requirement would be necessitated as to the second question, legislative, in nature. (4) However, the Pennsylvania statute mandated a
full quasi-judicial hearing on due notice in which both of the above
questions would be heard and determined; this is the usual and ordinary method pursued in these types of proceedings.
(5) Although
one order would be entered by the commission at the conclusion of
such a quasi-judicial hearing, that order would contain the findings
and determinations in both areas, i.e., on the quasi-judicial and the
quasi-legislative aspects. (6) In this case there was no judicial dispute
concerning the quasi-judicial determination that the "water company
[was] demanding unreasonable rates";9 1 in the type of agency proceeding where only such a power is exercised, the usual, ordinary,
and customary scope of review is the substantial evidence-whole record
rule, with the doctrine of the finality of fact applying where such rule
is judicially found to have been observed and followed. (7) It was
only the fixing of the lower rates which was contested, i.e., the
agency's quasi-legislative determination on the valuation, with both justices agreeing that the "order here involved . . . was legislative in
character."9 2 (8) In this type of agency proceeding where only such
certainment of the fair value of the property, for rate making purposes, is not a matter
of formulas, but it is a matter which calls for the exercise of a sound and reasonable
judgment upon a proper consideration of all relevant facts." Id. at 299. See text accompanying note 103 infra.
90. There are, of course, numerous other questions which may be involved, e.g.,
the conceptual basis to be used for purposes of valuation, so that we here limit drastically the scope of the analysis. But see note 89 supra and text accompanying note
103 infra. One major question revolves around the rights of the public, i.e., the small
consumer, and its economic and other interest. Does the "promotional" rate system
approved by the California Public Utilities Commission, whereby the more electricity
a customer uses the less he pays, result in a violation of equal protection, run afoul
of the statutory requirements concerning an environmental impact report, or otherwise
deprive users of substantive due process rights?
91. 253 U.S. at 288 (McReynolds, J.).
92. Id. at 289 (Justice McReynolds). Justice Brandeis stated: "The Commission's [rate] order, although entered in a proceeding commenced upon due notice, con-
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a quasi-legislative power is exercised and no statutorily mandated full
hearing has been required and held, then it is only on judicial review
that a person, for the first time, obtains such a full hearing before
that person's property is finally taken, and on such review no agency
quasi-legislative findings of fact are usually binding on the court regardless of how much or how cogent the "evidence" is in the record.
(9) Regardless of this, where a statutorily mandated full hearing is
nevertheless held in that quasi-legislative proceeding, then the customary scope of review should be limited by the substantial evidence-

whole record rule, with finality of fact resulting.

(10) However, if

the "weight of evidence" rule is to be used then the state court could
"substitute" its "judgment for that of the commission" on the findings.9" (11) Unless Brandeis was contradicted directly or was so
wrong that rejection is clearly unnecessary, then his reference to the
"objections to the valuation made by the company [which] raise no
question of law but concern pure matters of fact '9 4 must be accepted
ducted according to judicial practice and participated in throughout by the company,
was a legislative order; and, being such, the company was entitled to a judicial review."
Id. at 293.
93. Id. at 289 (Justice McReynolds quoting "substitution" from the lower court's
opinion).
This holding, that "substitution" by a state court of its findings of fact for those
of the state agency was legally permissible, may be one aspect of the minority opinion.
Justice Brandeis, at one point, said that "the statute left open to the company, besides
this limited [substantial evidence] review, the right to resort in the state courts, as
well as in the federal court, to another and unrestricted remedy; the one commonly
pursued when challenging the validity of a legislative order of this nature, namely, a
suit in equity to enjoin its enforcement." Id. at 294. He cited two state cases and
the Pennsylvania statute for this proposition, the latter concluding that in such an injunction action the state court might "set aside, annul, or modify" the order. Id. (the
past tense "set aside, annulled, or modified" was in the statute). But, as we have already seen in our previous discussion, when this ability to substitute (or modify) court
findings for those of the agency is exercised, the court turns into a legislative body
or a superagency, and it is not judicial review which is accorded but an independent
fixing of new rates as if an internal appeal within an agency were being conducted.
See text accompanying note 30 supra. While this is constitutionally permitted to states
and the federal government within its territories and possessions and the District of
Columbia, when an Article III federal court is to be directly involved, then the statute
is unconstitutional and the court will refuse to review. However, there is no reason
why a state cannot require its own courts to so act (assuming no state constitutional
prohibition applies), and then, subsequently, find that the federal courts are exercising
only an Article III power to judicially review that state (legislative) court's determmation, assuming a federal question, for example, were involved and properly presented
(as occurred in the majority's holding if limited solely to the due process question).
In this view of the Ben Avon proceedings and statutes, the statement by Brandeis, "as
well as in the federal court," is either in error or is used in the limited sense just
discussed.
94. Id. at 299.
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as a correct statement. (12) But on this premise his application of
the substantial evidence-whole record rule, as with its application by
the state agency and the state supreme court, cannot be faulted, i.e.,
pure fact determinations are solely for the agency in a mandated full
hearing which is otherwise procedurally unimpeachable. (13) The
majority nowhere specifically disagrees with this line of reasoning but
presents a new basis for its holding, namely, the indirect constitutional
fact theory. (14) The majority contends this constitutional fact basis
requires a de novo review, whereas the minority contends there is
either no such basis, i.e., only a "pure!' fact is involved, or else Ben
Avon Borough did receive a quasi-judicial full hearing and is not constitutionally entitled to a second.
It is now that the direct-indirect constitutional fact distinction between Crowell and Ng Fung Ho, elucidated earlier, may illuminate the
Ben Avon picture. As with Crowell, there is only an indirect and
implied constitutional fact which can be spelled out here;9 5 but this
fact is further subordinated to another concept which, in effect, removes the fact one additional degree, namely, the distinction between
confiscation and its capital and its legal aspects. For it is only in the
former that one conceivably still may urge that a de novo review is
required constitutionally, and even there the line of cases following
Ben Avon has successively narrowed that requirement and, like the
Cheshire cat's grin, caused Ben Avon's effectiveness to fade into the
background, if not disappear altogether. But the rationale behind
these statements and conclusions presents a modem rejection of any
de novo review as a matter of logic, practice, and constitutional necessity. That rationale postulates the bifurcated concept of confiscation
just given and distinguishes between the consequences flowing in each
situation.
The capital and legal aspects of confiscation may be illustrated
and defined briefly. The former, generally speaking, may refer to
the actuality of any financial investment, what the classical economists
95. The constitutional umbilical cord proceeds from the substantive due process
clause of the Fourteenth or Fifth Amendment, to the property which Ben Avon Borough claimed was being confiscated. Whether or not such a confiscation would follow
from the public service commission's figures could not be theory, law, or conjectureit had to be fact (Brandeis' "pure" fact). Once this fact substantively existed (proved
evidentially) then the constitutional tie-in or connection was closed, and by surrendering this fact determination ever so slightly to an agency (the finality of fact doctrine),
the judiciary was denigrating a person's constitutional rights and depriving that person
of an independent judicial determination of the basis for that constitutional right. However, to repeat, the fact of confiscation has yet to be discussed.
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would term risk capital, whether in the form of money, machinery,
or other assets. The latter, again generally speaking, may refer to
profits, dividends, interest, or any form of return based upon or stemming from or including the former, e.g., expectations of profit as where
utilized as an element of damage in a law suit. It is ordinarily difficult
to conceive of a legal aspect, as here termed, without a capital investment or outlay, and, pari passu, as this latter diminishes or disappears,
the former likewise should diminish or disappear, although capital may
remain constant or even increase and still find the return decreasing
or vanishing, e.g., a public service commission may continue or even
increase the valuation of a utility's property and yet drastically reduce
the rate of return.
One additional factor completes the picture, at least for these purposes, namely, that in the utility's valuation and return one may speak
of absolute and relative figures. In other words, and simplistically illustrated, the percentage rate is a relative figure which, when applied
to the base (valuation of utility's property), gives an absolute figure;
albeit, that base may itself be a fluctuating, periodical one. In effect,
this means that all figures are variables for different purposes. 96 On
the basis of these illustrations, the utility's investment, at the very least,
must be maintained. Consequently, the rate must contain at least one
portion to maintain and replace the capital and a second to give the
incentive, in a risk economy, to invest. This latter may be reflected
hypothetically in the percentage rate qua rate, whereas the former may
be reflected in the valuation of the property, so that we may assume
that too low a valuation results in capital impairment and confiscation.
A few applicable conclusions may now be drawn from the preceding: (1) Utilities are regulated monopolies. (2) Regulatory agencies
today have replaced the early common law king-parliament and colonial-nineteenth century legislative control. (3) Not only are the prices
for services or other items determined by such an agency, they also
reflect the agency's determination of those factors entering into them,
e.g., costs of raw materials, wages, interest on loans or bonds. (4)
One of these factors entering into the agency's price determination
is maintenance of capital. (5) Another such factor is the dividend
to be paid to the owners of the capital. (6) Even though an agency's
price or rate fixing results in sufficient capital maintenance, the divi96.

The type of variables utilized may be illustrated by the "promotional" rate

system. See note 90 supra. For example, an industrial user may pay one-eighth the
rate of a residential user. No particular theory of valuation is mandated. FPC v.
Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944).
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dend or return may be, say, 10 percent, 6 percent, or even 0 percent.
(7) Where this dividend return falls below a fair market return then,
because of the regulatory and limiting aspect of the utility's ability to
charge what it might deem sufficient to give this fair return, the utility
finds its profit expectations and dividends taken from it, i.e., it finds
its property expectations taken substantively by an agency exercising
legislative powers even though in a statutorily mandated setting of procedural due process. (8) And, to continue these thoughts, the rate
so allowed may even result in a negative dividend, i.e., minus 0 percent, so that capital must be invaded. For example, if fixed payments
must be met, then any businessman has to invest more, or borrow,
mortgage, or even sell, and obviously here the preceding conclusion
of a taking is manifestly stronger and even an absolute.
In other words, in the situation envisaged by (7) above, there
may be an absolute dollar substantive taking vis-a-vis a fair market
return, as where capital is placed in a bank or government bonds, regardless of the rate allowed. Put differently, the investor gets say six
dollars from a "market" investment but less from his utility investment
where the property's value (or even the rate) is too low; and this
difference, so goes the argument, is therefore of a substantive taking
(or, based on comparisons, an implied legal confiscation) insofar as
the regulatory agency acts with governmental power and ultimate approval (if the finality of fact doctrine applies). And in the situation
envisaged by (8) above, these consequences and conclusions are even
more apparent and magnified when the rate-valuation combination results in too low a positive 97 or even a negative or minus 0 percent
dividend, for then capital must be invaded and ultimately the utility
becomes bankrupt (a capital confiscation, i.e., an absolute and factual
one, with no judicial fiction required). While in both situations one
may argue that there is a taking, still, in (7) above it is a comparative one which ordinarily results only when the dividend or return
is cast against the so-called market but capital remains at least unimpaired; whereas in (8) above it is an absolute capital taking, i.e., one's
property itself is now being diminished with, perhaps, an eventual
complete loss.
The so-called legal (reduced dividend) confiscation is thus really
not confiscation in fact save if one creates a fiction that any govern97. As noted above, we assume that one portion of the return allowed goes to
repair, maintenance, etc. of the existing capital, so that when a return is set which
not only does not allow dividends, but also cuts into this maintenance portion, then
in effect it becomes a negative dividend-at least for this purpose.
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mental agency's deliberate action resulting in a lesser return than obtainable on the open market is to be equated with an absolute loss
of one's property. Generally speaking, the utility's investors enter a
comparatively risk free environment, with a somewhat assured safety,
and ordinarily find a haven for capital plus appreciation and dividends
slightly higher than in banks or governmental bonds; but there always
is somewhat of a risk present insofar as capital or return may be diminished or lost, as where railroads lose out to automobiles and air transportation. If, however, both utility capital and return are in effect
now to be guaranteed by the government, then governmental bonds
or other such investments are in danger of losing a market (as in the
E bonds situation currently), for these ordinarily are lower in return
and therefore lesser in attractiveness than such utility stocks (ignoring
tax-free advantages). Furthermore, removing all forms and degrees
of risk from utility investments, in effect, clothes the government with
the indicia of ownership, e.g., as if it were contracting out to, or hiring
as employees, the managers and having fictionalized governmental
bonds (the utility's stocks). This reductio ad absurdum is economic
and political anathema in the context of our history and mores, so that
an element of risk and even loss, like a lesser return, must be present.
The only real question would be whether the government might take
property (capital) so indirectly without a complete de novo judicial
imprimatur being constitutionally required. In other words, confiscation, as here interpreted and analyzed, is to be restricted to capital,
if it is to be applied anywhere as a limiting concept, so that, in this
total aspect of viewing the regulatory process, one must reject de novo
review of a public utility commission's determination as to this portion
of the rate of return, i.e., dividend on capital.
But this "proof" of administrative finality of fact as to legal confiscation (the dividend portion), in effect, seems to prove too much, for
are we not now wedded to a de novo review of capital confiscation
(either too low a positive or a negative return)? The short answer
is no, for practical reasons. A distinction must be made between a
utility or like regulated business which is in continuing and even increasing demand for public (governmental) or private (consumer)
purposes, and one which finds itself in a reduced or shrinking market.
The former, whether for governmental or consumer reasons, has to
be continued and even improved, as witness the huge governmental
loans and credit made available to the railroad and airplane industries
these past few years. One might urge that the national (defense or
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economic) interest requires all this, but this is not presently of moment.
What is of importance is that where a continuing (increasing and
elastic) demand exists, agencies must permit all maintenance, and
even increased capacity, through the valuation-rate syndrome; and,
furthermore that, where there is a reduced or shrinking demand, the

risk aspect of the original investment enters so as to preclude a government-sponsored subsidy indirectly (from the served and affected consumers) or directly (save where the alleged national interest so re-

quires).

In either situation, the body able to cope with these eco-

nomic and other questions, having expertise and a specialized body
of knowledge, with direct and immediate access to the executive and

legislative branches if required, is most certainly not an Article III
court. These bodies are not able to probe as deeply and as continually
as is required, 9 8 seldom exercise a continuing jurisdiction extending

over a period of years in these situations, and do not have the adaptability and flexibility required.99 This means, in effect, that administra-

tive quasi-judicial determinations, based upon such an over-all ability
and procedure, must be accorded a degree of judicial respect for reasons of policy and of practice.
98. One may, of course, point to some antitrust cases to refute these views, but
the point is that such judicial marathons are not the rule but the exception-here we
speak of a general approach and rule.
99. Because it is ordinarily compelled to serve all of the public, the utility might
urge that whether under the Fifth or Fourteenth (as incorporated) Amendments eminent domain clause, where the government or its agency takes one's property, albeit
for a public purpose and use, a fair and reasonable amount to be determined by the
judiciary must be paid, so that, pari passu, the same principle should apply in these
rate making situations. Cf. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (inverse
condemnation); Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527 (1906) (a
state may delegate power of eminent domain to a private person under some circumstances). Or, as the late Justice Black urged several times, when the judiciary (as a
branch of the government) denied an injunction against, and thereby upheld, picketing
which resulted in a loss of business, then perhaps the government ought to recompense
the entrepreneur as in an eminent domain proceeding. See, e.g., Amalgamated Food
Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968), discussed in
Forkosch, Picketing in Shopping Centers, 26 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 250 (1969). However, these arguments overlook the basic distinction here discussed, namely, that in
these and other situations there is ordinarily no agency intervening between the alleged
taking and the ultimate judicial review. In other words, in eminent domain, picketing,
and other cases the judiciary is ordinarily immediately and directly involved, with no
agency findings of fact ordinarily to be reviewed or having the imprimatur of finality
placed upon them.
Another aspect, more applicable to the situation here, and involving an indirect
type of eminent domain, might parallel such agency rate-valuation matters to the concept and application of inverse condemnation mentioned above.
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The degree of respect so to be accorded by the judiciary may
range from 0 percent (thereby according a full and complete trial to
the utility, with the full panoply of procedural due process, or utilizing
the agency and trial records and making and substituting its own findings of fact) to 100 percent (as interpreted here, thereby applying
the substantial evidence-whole record rule, as well as the finality of
fact doctrine), or even to some in between point. For example, even
though mouthing the 100 percent approach, the judiciary may impose
obstacles to its grant of a de novo review such as giving the administrative findings a "strong presumption" of regularity, 10 0 or placing upon
the opponent the burden of showing these findings to be "unreasonable or unlawful by clear and satisfactory evidence";' or the judiciary
may require that "all pertinent evidence . . .should be submitted to
[the agency] in the first instance and should not be received by the
District Court as though it were conducting a trial de novo" ;112 or the
judiciary even may utilize a practical, substantial approach which may
in effect all but overrule its previous decisions, e.g., "It is not theory
but the impact of the rate order which counts. If the total effect of
the rate order cannot be said to be unjust and unreasonable, judicial
103
inquiry under the Act is at an end."'
Where a statute requires 100 percent review, other questions
not appearing, there is nothing constitutionally to prevent a state court
from turning itself into a superagency; federal courts, however, are
restricted constitutionally 04 unless another constitutional provision upholds a person's superior right in this respect. 1 5 When two constitu100. See, e.g., St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 53
(1938), quoting from a prior case that "in a question of rate-making there is a strong
presumption in favor of the conclusions reached by an experienced administrative body
after a full hearing."
101. Fernandez v. Arizona Water Co., 516 P.2d 49, 52 (Ariz. 1973): "[A] party

dissatisfied with the findings of the Commissioner may appeal to the Superior Court.
The party will receive a trial de novo on the merits of his case.

He will have the

burden of showing that the Commission ruling was unreasonable or unlawful by clear
and satisfactory evidence." Cf. City of Phoenix v. Superior Court, 515 P.2d 1175
(Ariz. 1973) (rejection of a de novo trial under a different statutory provision).
102. New York v. United States, 331 U.S. 289, 335 (1947).
103. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944); see Alabama PSC
v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341 (1951). This quoted remark did not put an end to
Ben Avon, as witness the federal and state cases cited in ADMNisTRATrwE LAw, supra

note 1, at 755 nn.95-96. See text accompanying note 41 supra.
104. See notes 30, 93 and accompanying text supra, and the quotation from
Crowell in note 65 supra.
105.

See, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 235 U.S. 22 (1932); Ng Fung Ho v. White,

259 U.S. 276 (1922); Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287
(1920).
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tional clauses clash, judicial resolution may include a balancing technique, with the powers or rights of both set off against one another
on the scales of individual, national, or other interests, needs, concerns,
or requirements.' 0 6 In the utilization of the limitations just referred
to above, the judiciary has retreated from the harsh consequences resulting from a full de novo review; it is suggested that the antipathy
of the courts to regulatory and other agency proceedings and determinations has softened greatly since the 1920s and 1930s, and that necessity, the mother of the Holmesian "quasi,"'1 ° 7 requires a definitive resolution of this ghost of the past.
One final comment: the common law's formalisms were rejected
in the early American constitutions and courts except as useful and
applicable to native conditions and requirements.'1 8 So, too, have the
strictures of the common law been rejected, especially where a narrow,
formal type of deductive logic was utilized and applied not only to
procedures but also to reasoning. In other words, the best features
of our English heritage were sought to be retained for use here as
required. Perhaps, therefore, two conclusions may be drawn: first,
the type of constitutional logic' 0 9 employed in the past and rejected
by the U.S. Supreme Court where the consequences were not desirable'1 0 should also be rejected in this de novo type of situation, save
where policy otherwise may require as in the Ng Fung Ho" case;
106. Despite objection to the use of this balancing technique for coping with problems (e.g., by the late Justice Black), the Supreme Court adheres to this technique's
inclusion as part of its judicial armory. See, e.g., Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530
(1972): "The approach we accept is a balancing test, in which the conduct of both
the prosecutor and the defendant are weighed." See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note
67, at 421-23.
107. See notes 18-19 supra. On the court's early antipathy, see Justice Jackson's
language in United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642 (1950), that "[wle
must not disguise the fact that sometimes, especially early in the history of the federal
administrative tribunal, the courts were persuaded to engraft judicial limitations upon
the administrative process." However, Justice Jackson immediately continued: "More
recent views have been more tolerant of it than those which underlay many older decisions." Id. See also Evans v. Monaghan, 306 N.Y. 312, 324, 118 N.E.2d 452 (1954);
Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. P.S.C., 314 Pa. 207, 171 A. 690, 693 (1934); Local Gov't
Bd. v. Arlidge, A.C. 120, 138 (1915).
108. For example, see the labor cases quoted and cited in Forkosch, The Doctrine
of Criminal Conspiracy and its Modern Application to Labor, 40 TExAs L. REv. 303,
323-24, 473 n.1 (1962).
109. See text accompanying notes 65-72, 80 supra.
110. E.g., Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442 (1886) (utilizing the strict
logic of Blackstone, but rejected in application in Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 374 (1940)).
111. See, e.g., K. & L. Distrib., Inc. v. Murkowski, 486 P.2d 351, 357-58 (Alas.
1971).
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and, second, the necessity for, and usefulness of, the administrative
form of regulatory fact determination has been proved abroad, espec-

ially in England (and also here in all other nonconstitutional situations), so that the consequences to persons and courts, attendant upon
forthrightly substituting the substantial evidence-whole record rule for
current exceptions and aberrations in our federal and state systems,
112
cannot be catastrophic or harmful.
112. See the comment in 4 K. DAvis, ADMINSTRATrVE LAw TREATISE, § 30.14
(1958), on the influences affecting the judiciary's views and also "the comparative
qualification of court and agency to decide the particular [fact] used."
Author's Note: Since the writing of this article the California Supreme Court has
decided Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Ass'n., - C.2d -,
- P.2d - (March 25, 1974) by a bare majority of 4-3. That state's Code of Civil
Procedure § 1094.5, pursuant to which judicial review of administrative orders or decisions occurs, was extended to "local agencies and state agencies of local jurisdiction,"
thereby applying to them the same scope of review used for "state agencies of legislative origin having statewide jurisdiction." Thus the adjudicatory orders or decisions
of both classes of agencies are now, in California, subjected to the following rule:
If the order of decision of the agency substantially affects a fundamental vested
right, the trial court, in determining under section 1094.5 whether there has been
an abuse of discretion because the findings are not supported by the evidence,
must exercise its independent judgment on the evidence and find an abuse of
discretion if the findings are not supported by the weight of the evidence. If, on
the other hand, the order or decision does not substantially affect a fundamental
vested right, the trial court's inquiry will be limited to a determination of whether
or not the findings are supported by substantial evidence in the light of the whole
record.
This rule is not applicable to those "categories . . . of agencies of constitutional
origin which have been granted limited judicial power by the Constitution itself," and
also "To be distinguished from adjudicatory determinations of an administrative
agency are actions undertaken by such an agency in its legislative capacity," for these
latter are subject to review under § 1085 of the Code (fn. 2 of majority opinion).
The independent judgment standard above enunciated applies to an agency order
or decision which "substantially affects a fundamental vested right," i.e., one "which
has been legitimately acquired or is otherwise 'vested,' and when that right is of a
fundamental nature from the standpoint of its economic aspect or its 'effect . . . in
human terms and the importance . . . to the individual in the life situation,' .... "
In Strumsky plaintiff's right to receive a service-connected death allowance (her husband
died following surgery) was held to be such a fundamental vested right.

